

Monitoring and Observation of Elections in Africa

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Abstract

Competitive and periodic elections are central to democracy and constitute a critical index of popular empowerment. They provide a mechanism of orderly political succession in a democracy, and very significantly too, serve to confer legitimacy on those who govern. Transitioning from predominantly one-party systems, where elections were essentially a ritual with hardly any implications for ruling personnel changes, and military regimes in which succession possibilities often revolved around the violent counter-coup, meant for many African countries, enthroneing multiparty elections as the standard mode of political succession.

In essence, the spate of transitions to multi-party democracy in various parts of Africa in the past decade have transformed elections, albeit multi-party elections into the preferred means, in fact, constitutionally mandatory means of political succession in many African countries. However, the history of competitive elections in much of Africa indicates a process often marred by pre-and post-electoral crises. Such crises generally arise from lack of confidence in the electoral process, the agency charged with the conduct of elections, and the election outcome. The symptoms of these crises include the threatened, or actual boycott of elections by opposition parties, violence and intimidation of political opponents, and quite often, a refusal to accept officially declared results by aggrieved parties.

To function effectively as a midwife of democratic succession and command the confidence of the electorate however, elections must not only be free and fair, they must also be seen to be so. In the circumstances, election monitoring and observation have evolved as standard mechanisms for assisting in the conduct of free and fair elections, increasing voters' confidence in the electoral process, enhancing the acceptability of election outcome and the legitimacy of the governments constituted through such elections.

This paper examines in broad terms, the monitoring and observation process in general elections in African countries since the 1990s. Drawing from experiences in the continent, it examines the rationale of election observation and their effectiveness in achieving their mission, the tension between observation and sovereignty, between monitoring and observation, and the problem of funding observer missions. It contends that the main problems of election monitoring and observation in Africa can be addressed through grafting it to the peer review mechanism of NEPAD, institutionalizing it at the level of the AU, and elaborating on the pre-election phase through long-term observation.

1. Election Monitoring and Observation: The Rationale

In a simple sense, monitoring and observation of election is a process through which an election is scrutinized and evaluated “for purposes of determining its impartiality in terms of organization and administration”. It involves “stationing of independent missions, officials or individuals representing international or local organizations for a specified time in a country which is in the process of organizing a national election with a mandate to closely observe and pronounce on the entire process and outcome”¹

Electoral observation and monitoring are “designed to boost confidence in the fairness of the electoral process, to help deter fraud in the balloting and counting procedures, and to report to the country’s citizens and the international community on the overall integrity of the elections. In addition, if requested and if appropriate, observers can mediate disputes between competing political groups in an effort to reduce tensions before, during and after elections.”² Election monitoring is essentially an impartial third-party role to ensure free and fair elections.

The development of the idea of election monitoring is very much tied to the recent resurgence of civil society and its continuing role in the engineering of democratic rule to that extent, election observation could be seen as reflection of a particular stage of the involvement of civil society in the democratization process. Its success in that regard is also suggestive of its claim to legitimacy. The whole phenomenon of international observation does not only underline that legitimacy, it also indicates the extent civil society has become internationalized.

In spearheading the struggle for democracy, civil society also directly stakes a claim to its own autonomy and a specific role, a watchdog role in public affairs.

Once the acceptance of the concept of democracy has been won in principle, civil society was not ready to allow for the dilution, and possible adulteration which authoritarian regimes, from which the principle of democracy has just been won, be given the full reins to implement its realization. In a way, civil society was not only staking a claim to autonomy, but institutionalizing its own role in the consolidation of democracy. In other words, the election proper becomes another stage in the struggle for democracy in which civil society must define a role for itself in the continuing effort to check the possibility of arbitrary rule. There was also a direct interest in civil society monitoring of elections. In transition situations where civil society had to transform itself into political society and therefore, confront the ruling regime directly in elections, it was necessary to have some independent monitoring of the electoral watchdog constituted by the ruling regime in order to ensure fair play for itself.

Further more, if the competing claims by different segments of society are to be mediated through the free choice of the people, elections as the mode of determining that free choice has to be seen as being insulated from possible abuse by the state or interested parties. Observation and monitoring become third-party mechanism of ensuring that elections serve as effective mechanism of conflict resolution, and for constructing more acceptable, effective and legitimate governmental structures.³

In essence, electoral observation takes on the role of “a popular ‘seal of quality’ to legitimize new governments.”⁴ In monitoring and Observation, the concept of accountability and good governance find immediate expression in the agency charged with responsibility for the conduct of elections. But beyond this, in ensuring that elections

truly reflect popular choices, observation becomes a wider tool, perhaps in an anticipatory sense, of compelling some degree of fidelity to a mandate.⁵

Thus, election observation gives credibility to governments, actualise the popular choice and overall, promote democratic consolidation. Election observation constitute a source of psychological support for those involved in the election, they can uncover rigging, inform the public about the fairness of the election process, and mediate in cases of disputes which may have a perennial character.⁶ As they observe all phases of the electoral process – pre-election, polling and post election phases, they report on the electoral laws and the level of compliance with them by electoral officials, government officials and voters. They compile complaints about the electoral list, election laws, voting, vote counting and announcement of results, and make reports on these to appropriate authorities. Such reports are expected to contain their judgment on the conduct of the election as well as its overall quality.

2. Election Monitoring and Observation in Africa: An Overview

Election monitoring is not new in Africa.⁷ It will not be out of place to say that elections in Africa, from colonial days have always been the subject of some sort of monitoring and observation. Journalists have always observed elections in order to report on them. Security agencies have equally been deployed not only to maintain law and order during elections, but also to ensure that that electoral rules and regulations are adhered to by electoral officials and voters. Political parties usually send their agents to monitor voting in virtually all voting booths in any constituency in which they field a candidate. Finally, since colonial times, scholars have carried out field observations of elections in Africa and came out with detailed analyses and findings.

All these are still part of elections in Africa. However, since the late 1980s, election observation and monitoring in the continent have taken on a qualitatively different dimension from these earlier processes. This new dimension is the growing institutionalized, third-party role of civil society groups, international organizations, inter-governmental groups and foreign governments in the conduct of elections in Africa. Usually organized outside the realm of the state, but with its consent, election observation and monitoring have become points at which groups, domestic and international affirm a stake in democratic sustainability in countries undergoing transitions to democracy. “The idea is that given the transition situation, both institutions and the culture supporting free and fair elections are weak. Newly emerging opposition parties are often suspicious *vis a vis* the government or the ruling party, and the population insecure.”⁸ Monitoring such elections becomes a confidence building measure, a deterrent tool against electoral fraud, and in post-conflict situations, a mechanism of conflict resolution.

In the context of the Zimbabwe Independence elections of 1980, the first contemporary election monitoring in Africa could be seen primarily as being within a post-conflict situation. The next important examples, the Namibian elections of 1989 and the South African Election of 1994 were of a similar variety. In most cases, international observer teams came from the Commonwealth, the United Nations, Organisation of African Unity, the European Union and smaller groups from NGOs, and individual country missions. As the EU reported with reference to the South African election, co-ordination, sorely needed among all these groups was “virtually impossible”, while “there was a tendency towards election tourism.”⁹ Co-ordination was required in order to optimally deploy available personnel from otherwise independent organizations, determine a common

code of conduct, operational rules, and reporting standards. Considered more objective and all-embracing, the task of co-ordination fell to the UN, but its highly bureaucratic nature led to delay in deployment of observers. At the end of the exercise, a list of imperfections and irregularities came out in the reports, but one problem that was again visible at this point was that the joint-missions statement issued by the UN and the pronouncements of the EU expressed somewhat divergent view on the elections, with the former depicting the elections in more favourable terms.¹⁰ The most important thing however was that the outcome was accepted by all parties.

However, if the previous cases of a post-conflict nature produced results which were readily accepted by all parties, the Angolan case (1992) showed that observation and a pronouncement on the fairness of the elections do not necessarily guarantee acceptance by some parties. While UNITA refused to accept the results, the impact of the pronouncements of international observers on the election was evident in the sanctions and international isolation that were imposed on it even from its erstwhile friends.

The admission of observers and monitors into transition elections has often been controversial, and in some cases, reluctantly accepted by incumbent regimes. Even when accepted, there may be attempts by the government to interfere with its operation. The typical case that comes to mind in this regard is the observation and monitoring process that attended the Nigerian Presidential Election of 1993.¹¹ The Nigerian Election Monitoring Group (NEMG) was set up by the military regime as governmental organ made up of civil society groups to monitor the 1993 elections. Its genesis was therefore a problem from the onset. It was difficult for the political parties to accept its neutrality. Some of the civil society organizations invited to join the body as local monitors bluntly refused to do so, preferring instead to make their own independent arrangements for monitoring.¹² For example, the Civil Liberties Organisation, CLO rejected the invitation to be part of the NEMG "because it considered election monitoring a non-governmental affair."¹³ The CLO thus came up with its own Election Monitoring Programme, (EPG). The implications of these divergent monitoring profiles were to become apparent before and after the elections. The first of these was in the conception of the monitoring process. A basic distinction usually made between Observers and Monitors is in their functions with reference to elections. Monitors are citizens and can supposedly intervene in the actual conduct of the election, at whatever stage should they detect any anomaly. Observers on the other hand are international groups and individual who can only watch proceedings, but must not interfere. Their Observations can only come in later in the forms of reports.

This distinction was inadmissible to the government, which insisted that both the local groups and the international groups must be collapsed into the observation function. NEMG could conceivably accept this interpretation of its role, but the EMP could not define its own role in such passive terms. Secondly, when the military annulled the election and prohibited any further pronouncement on the outcome, NEMG dissolved, was heard no more. However, the EMP remained vocal on its pronouncement that the election was free and fair and the moral and political duty of the military regime was to declare the winner and hand over power to him. It has to be pointed out that the formation of an election monitoring group by the Government is not typical in Africa. In fact, the monitoring experience of the Zambian election of 1991 from which Nigeria got sold on the idea of monitoring was wholly an initiative of civil society.¹⁴

The issue of sovereignty has often cropped up in the relationship between international observer missions and African states. The concept of foreign observation of African

election is seen by some as neo-colonial, and an admission that these countries are incapable of conducting their affairs in an orderly manner.¹⁵ As Matlosa noted, there is an uneven application of the concept of monitoring and observation. While democracies in the developed capitalist world are held to be “mature, consolidated and fully institutionalized” and therefore require no breach of sovereignty in the form of external examination and scrutiny, developing countries emerging from decades of authoritarian rule are “young, fragile and conflict ridden”, and therefore need external observation to conduct decent and acceptable elections. This is reinforced through the political conditionality of aid.¹⁶ Of course, elements of civil society recognize the crucial role of foreign observer missions in helping to get authoritarian regimes out of power, and therefore support them.¹⁷

Dictators tolerate them to avoid isolation and sanctions globally. One major concession, of course is that election observer missions must be put in place on the basis of a formal invitation by the government concerned.¹⁸ But this has not always prevented frictions. Two cases, drawn from Nigeria (1993) and Zimbabwe (2002) suffice to illustrate this.

Less than 48 hours to the 1993 presidential election in Nigeria, an Abuja high Court issued an injunction restraining the electoral agency from conducting the elections. The director of the United States Information Services (USIS) in Nigeria issued a statement expressing the United States Government opposition to any attempt to postpone the election under any pretext. The military regime saw this as an unwarranted interference in Nigeria’s internal affairs. It therefore demanded the immediate recall of the USIS director, while withdrawing the accreditation of the United States Observer mission to the election. While the state-owned media applauded this as resistance to neo-colonialism, the widespread feeling among many Nigerians was that it was a timely intervention and that without it, it was doubtful whether the elections would have been held at all, given what happened later by way of the annulment of the results of the election.

The more recent case is that of Zimbabwe. The parliamentary elections of 2000 as well as the presidential elections of 2002 were held against the background of acrimonious relationship between Britain and Zimbabwe over the latter’s land policy. The opposition parties allegation of widespread human rights abuses on the part of the ZANU-PF Government clearly created a charged atmosphere in the run up to the elections. This was not in any way helped by the fact that a few days towards the election, the government amended the electoral law, making the appointment of observers and monitors the responsibility of the Electoral Supervisory Commission. In addition, a condition of accreditation for foreign observers was the payment of a fee of US\$100. Local monitors were expected to pay an accreditation fee of Z\$1000. Matlosa suggests that these were meant to “control and regulate observers with a view to protecting the political integrity of the election and guarding against the possible erosion of national sovereignty.”¹⁹

However, this was perceived by the international observers as well as the opposition parties as a deliberate attempt to reduce the scope and visibility of observer missions and therefore create opportunities for irregularities. Pre-election remarks such as the one made by the US-based National Democratic Institute that the election process was fraudulent led to charges of bias by the Government of Zimbabwe. The consequence was a ban on foreign NGOs from mounting observer missions. Included in this ban were the NDI, the International Republican Institute, and observers from the UK and selected observers from other countries, including Kenya and Nigeria.²⁰ The NDI commented that:

The refusal to accredit certain observers violates international standards for democratic elections and is counter to the practice of Zimbabwe's neighbors and virtually all democratic countries."²¹

The NDI, which had earlier sent a pre-election team to Zimbabwe, further commented that from its own experience, Zimbabwe's action was only the second time "in the past decade that a country has refused to accredit observers from recognized international nongovernmental organizations and is the first time that a country has attempted to prohibit observers of specific nationalities. These negative practices isolate Zimbabwe from other countries in the region and beyond."²²

The fact of the ban did not prevent the NDI from reiterating its pre-election verdict. It maintained that with just four days to the election, the conditions for democratic elections do not exist in Zimbabwe. Irreparable damage has been done to the electoral process, particularly as a result of politically motivated violence. The lack of effective government action against such violence created an air of impunity that further harms the election environment—an environment that is marred by anxiety and fear.²³

This adverse comments did not deter the Zimbabwean Government from carrying its selective ban into the 2002 presidential elections.

By the time of the 2002 presidential election, relations between Zimbabwe and Britain had deteriorated considerably over the formers land policy. The relations with the EU and the United states had also deteriorated sharply, partly for what Zimbabwe saw as the UK's effort to isolate it globally, but also for its human rights record as well as its notably anti-free market ideological direction. The tension generated by this background situation led the Government of Zimbabwe to expel the head of the EU observer mission, Pierre Scholari, accusing him of continuously making utterances of a political nature. The EU reacted by withdrawing all its 35 observer from the country, but promising to evaluate the election by relying on "reports which would be given to them by other observer from other missions."²⁴ The EU immediately proceeded to impose sanctions on President Mugabe and those considered as being part of his "inner circle". These sanctions, "designed to hit the political elite, not the economy", according to the British Foreign Secretary, barred Mugabe and 19 of his close associates from traveling to Europe, impose an arms embargo and a freeze on any financial assets they may hold in the EU. The Zimbabwean Government regarded these sanctions as "economic terrorism", and vowed never to allow "in our country, a situation where our sovereignty rights are hijacked under the guise of election observation. We are happy that the world is larger than Europe and that we in Africa would like to be judged by Africans who share the same values with us."²⁵

However, the pronouncements of the African observer missions on the election were not generally complimentary on its conduct. The SADC Parliamentary Forum Election Observation Mission which sent 70 observers the climate of the election as being characterized by "high levels of polarization and intolerance" and the election campaign "marred by incidents of violence". The SADC observers did not only witness these acts, but that also, "its mission members were themselves targets of an orchestrated attack 10 kilometres out of Chinhoyi on 24 February."²⁶ It noted accusation of partisanship against the police, the predominance of opposition supporters among victims of electoral violence and intimidation, the absence of an independent electoral commission, and the virtual lack of access to the public media by political parties other than the ruling party. The SADC observer mission concluded that

The climate of insecurity obtaining in Zimbabwe since the 2000 parliamentary elections was such that the electoral process could not be said to adequately comply with the Norms and Standards of the SADC region.²⁷

This position was clearly supported by the United States Election Observer Team which found that youths from ZANU-PF-“the party of President Mugabe”, massively deployed in the countdown to election, “engaged in violent campaign of intimidation”, often with the assistance of the police, to deny voters for the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) access to rallies and polling stations. The ZANU-PF Government did not only fail to provide security to the main opposition presidential candidate, it supported or tolerated assaults by ZANU-PF youth militia on his campaign motorcade.²⁸ In the days leading to the election, the US noted that “only those who could show ZANU-PF party cards were allowed to purchase scarce maize meal.” It concluded that “the groundwork for the flawed March 9/10 election was laid over the last two years, a period during which the Government of Zimbabwe developed and employed an aggressive strategy designed to cripple political opposition. This strategy was marked by a collapse in the rule of law, serious human rights abuses, and the subversion of democratic institutions including the judiciary and independent media. At the same time, the Government of Zimbabwe pursued economic policies, including violent and chaotic land redistribution program that resulted in Zimbabwe’s downward economic spiral.²⁹

The Report of the South African Parliamentary Observer Mission was more circumspect in its verdict on the election. Indeed, it pronounced the 2002 Presidential elections “as a credible expression of the will of the people.”³⁰ Of course, it noted the oppositions parties concerns that there was widespread acts of violence, the existence of “no-go” areas, partisanship on the part of the police, denial of access to public media to the opposition parties, and the unfair advantage which the legal-constitutional framework conferred on the ruling party. It further documented 12 legal constraints which should ordinarily be seen to have adversely affected the free and fair conduct of the election, but nevertheless shied away from drawing that conclusion.

Issues in Election Monitoring and Observation in Africa

Many problems have been identified with election observation in Africa. Specifically, van Cranenburgh identifies four major weaknesses of international observer missions in Africa.³¹ First, international observation tends to be heavily focused on procedures on polling day. Although the climax, only an aspect of the election process, is actually accomplished on that day. The opportunities for abuse are usually created, deliberately, in the pre-election phase when constituencies are delineated, the electoral roll prepared, parties registered, candidates are chosen and campaigns carried out. “The period of field presence is often too short to cover the entire process,” get familiar with the local political situation or culture.³² This is very true of virtually most election observation in Africa. Even local monitors are deployed only on polling days, and hardly in sufficient number to ensure adequate coverage.

The absence of sufficient familiarity with the situation on the ground may lead to conclusions that are not fully in tune with the reality. The main strategy proposed for dealing with this problem is to make room for a system of long-term observation as opposed to short-term observation.³³ While short-time observation covers the activities of voting, vote counting and the declaration of results, long-term observation involves observing the events that define the electoral process “from the setting up of electoral management bodies, voter registration, voter education, candidate nomination and

political party registration, political campaigning and media issues, voting and the count, through to the installation of elected bodies.”³⁴

Long-term Observation allows for better exposure to the context in which the electoral process unfolds, and therefore presumably more informed judgment about the conduct of an election. Admittedly, some countries have tended to utilize their local embassy staff in this role, but its limited scope and ‘informality’ have tended to reduce its effectiveness. An expected drawback is how to generate the enormous resources to operationalise the concept. Another one is whether the observers’ role in the course of their stay in the host country would remain that of simply ‘observing’ and not intervening even if such intervention can lead to improvement in some pre-election activity with the possibility of a positive impact on the overall conduct of the election. One way to ameliorate these weaknesses is the transformation of long-term observation into monitoring. This would imply closer organizational relationship between local monitors and international observers than currently exists.

A second problem identified by van Cranenburgh is the lack of expertise on the part of observers. Recruitment of international observers tend to place emphasis on how influential and well-known the potential observer is rather than the relative skill level available for deployment on the job. However it must be pointed out that some countries with strong observation credentials have recognized this problem and have both refocused their recruitment as well as designed specific training programmes to make the exercise more effective. The third problem is that of “lack criteria and operational guidelines to assess the democratic nature of elections.”³⁵ Election observation is necessitated in countries where experience with the conduct of free and fair election is limited, and generally trying to create and nurture a democratic tradition. With the rules of the game still the subject of debate and yet to take firm root, “the norms for free and fair elections cannot be as strict as for those countries where democracy is consolidated.”³⁶ While this implies the necessity of defining criteria for accessing how free and fair elections are, it appears that the debate is often too universalized to take into account how local conditions of existence must necessarily define the content of democracy. As Mamdani noted, if democracy is to be meaningful in the African context, its form and scope has to be made relevant to the living conditions of the peasants and other popular groups.³⁷

It is the weakness in relating democracy to living conditions that seem to make nonsense of the prohibitions of undue influences in elections. In most African countries, the legal framework of elections generally tends to provide for safeguards against undue influences. For example, the provision of expenses, food, entertainment, or accommodation to any person to influence their vote or to demand any of these in return for ones vote. The use of force, coercion, abduction, threats, intimidation etc are usually prohibited.³⁸ These provisions are there but it may be safe to suggest that a substantial proportion of electoral malpractices in Africa directly hinge on these forms of undue influences. Reliance on the security forces for the enforcement of the legal provisions relating to these matters is singularly weak.

An equally significant problem in many African countries is the virtual absence of ground rules on electoral finance. It therefore becomes difficult to determine what to monitor in the in the election process. This is aided by the lack of attention to the subject of electioneering finance in Africa.³⁹ Although public funding of political parties is usually provided for in electoral laws, campaign funds are more often than not, derived from a

few wealthy individuals. The absence of any ceiling on contributions to parties or individual candidates has tended to turn parties into personal fiefdoms of their financiers and candidates into surrogates of their financial backers. In Nigeria where this trend is very much in evidence, much of the post-transition political crises have been of the intra-party variety, and much of that is traceable to the resistance by elected officials to being turned to surrogates of their financiers. A clear definition of limits to individual and corporate contributions will provide guidance as to what to monitor.

In elaborating the criteria and operational guidelines to assess the democratic nature of elections therefore, two debates are necessary. One must focus on synthesizing context and content, the other should relate monitoring and observation to content. These debates need not be compartmentalised. Rather, they should be simultaneous and incorporated within one another, with due acknowledgement that third-party monitoring of elections is necessary to democratic consolidation and sustainability.

The fourth problem as noted by Van Cranenburgh is the absence of a recognized procedure for the formulation of a common 'statement' by different observer missions about the conduct of the elections. Although this issue is treated by van Cranenburgh as one of co-ordination, there should really be no problem if some objective standard of observation can be agreed upon and various observer missions produce reports which adhere strictly with these standards. Such an objective reporting standard should be expected to produce reports by different observer missions which, nevertheless point to some consensual verdict. This is the important issue. The pressure to arrive at a consensus verdict in the absence of one suggests that observation and monitoring are not processes that are immune from the peculiar interests of organizations and states, but especially states, sending teams. The perception of this by host states, as the example of Zimbabwe shows, may further undermine the monitoring process by introducing elements of selectivity into the accreditation of observers and monitors.⁴⁰

The way forward may be the insulation of electoral observation from the foreign policy domain of individual countries. The idea is to establish a permanent monitoring and observation structures either as an independent multi-lateral institution or existing international organizations such as the United Nations or the OAU.⁴¹ These organizations and many other regional bodies in Africa have (ECOWAS, SADC) have already been moving in that direction. These need strengthening. The OAU in particular has already institutionalized its role in this direction. Benefits to be derived from this institutionalization will be felt in the areas of funding and the development of technical expertise in election observation. Foreign Observer teams generally fund their observer missions. Local monitors often rely on foreign funding as well. Invariably, the situation that arises is one in which the functions of observation and monitoring become new elements in a burgeoning donor-dependency syndrome, with all its implications for the sensitive issue of state autonomy. States sometimes react to this with a prohibition of external funding for local monitors. However, an international organization such as the AU could create a special fund for financing its observer role. It could also cut costs by incorporating domestic elements into its observer mission, deploying these in the role of long-term observers and monitors.

The Peer Review Mechanism of NEPAD has democracy and good governance as a core component. This has been housed in the AU. In July, 2002, The Assembly of Heads of States and Government adopted the *Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa*. Articles V and VI spelt out the role of election observation

and monitoring in the effort at democratic consolidation in Africa. Operationalising this role in the context of the peer review mechanism will ensure that African states observe and monitor their own elections within rules and regulations which they gave to themselves.

Conclusion

Election observation and monitoring is vital to the consolidation and sustainability of democracy in Africa. The requirements that the instruments and processes that define the electoral process need to be designed and operated by an impartial agency is not contested. But that impartiality is not to be taken for granted, nor the good intentions of ruling regimes be assumed away in matters of elections (whether their stakes in such election is direct or indirect) in the context of Africa where democratic elections as the preferred means of political succession is yet to take firm root. African states have embraced election observation and monitoring with varying degrees of enthusiasm. In fact, most African countries have had one election or the other subjected to processes of third-party observation and monitoring in the past decade. This has certainly not prevented electoral irregularities, sometimes, even on a massive scale. The pronouncements of observer teams, even when affirming the conduct of elections as free and fair, have not always led to their general acceptability, nor prevented the results of such elections from being annulled by unscrupulous regimes. These are problems that can be tackled within the framework of institutionalized observation and monitoring in which the collective definition of the rules of observation ensures that one is reviewed by peers.

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³⁸ For example, see The Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC Countries, 2000. Zimbabwe Elections Observer Mission Report, 24-25 June 2000. Auckland Park, EISA: 17-18.

³⁹ Tom Lodge . 2001 "How Political Parties finance Electoral Campaigning in Southern Africa", Journal of African Elections, Vol. 1, No.1: p.53.

⁴⁰ Such selectivity in accreditation was one of the main accusations which foreign observers, notably the United States and Norwegian Observer teams leveled against the Mugabe Administration in the 2002 Presidential election in Zimbabwe. See "US Findings on Zimbabwe Elections", op cit; and Norwegian Election Observation Mission, Presidential Elections in Zimbabwe 2002: Preliminary Report Issued on 12 March, 2002.

⁴¹ The Swedish Government was in the forefront in examining the feasibility of permanent, multilateral election monitoring body. See the article, "An International and Independent Institute for Electoral Assistance? A Feasibility Study", CODESRIA Bulletin, No. 2. 1993: See Also, Yusuf Bangura,, "Some Reactions to the Independent Electoral Commkission", CODESRIA Bulletin, No. 2. 1993.